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### The Complex Relationship Between Peacebuilding and Terrorism Approaches: Towards Post-Terrorism and a Post-Liberal Peace?

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# The Complex Relationship Between Peacebuilding and Terrorism Approaches: Towards Post-Terrorism and a Post-Liberal Peace?

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*Approaches to terrorism and peacebuilding have a complex relationship with each other, which may be explained according to four categories outlined in this article. These range from blocking each others' aims, nullifying terrorism, supporting a very limited, or a broader peace process. Each of these categories has implications for the inclusion and reconciliation of a wide range of actors and the hybrid nature of the emerging peace. This relates to the critical approach of using theory to create emancipatory forms of peace, which is used as a basis for the examination of the production of hybridity via the interaction of approaches to terrorism and peacebuilding in five cases in this article. These include Sri Lanka, Kashmir, the Middle East, Nepal, and Northern Ireland. We argue that "post-liberal" possibilities for a hybrid form of peace (which are inherent in such conflicts) offer a "post-terrorist" potential for peace processes.*

**Keywords** hybridity, Israel, Kashmir, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Palestine, peacebuilding, post-liberal, Sri Lanka, terrorism

## Introduction

Orthodox terrorism approaches, as with liberal peacebuilding, have become relatively empty signifiers that have lost some of the explanatory and practical traction they once had. This is due to their expropriation by policy and academic circles to support universalising understandings of political liberalism, neoliberal ideology, national and institutional interests, and because they have been successful in co-opting academic debates, to some degree at least.<sup>1</sup> This has interfered with the critical job of using theory to create emancipatory forms of peace. It is well known that both terrorism and orthodox terrorism responses may prevent peace processes from proceeding, as in Northern Ireland until the mid-1990s or in Sri Lanka and Kashmir. What is less well known is the evidence that approaches to both analysing

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and combating terrorism even in a critical vein may undermine and contradict peacebuilding processes, unless they themselves are in some way post-colonial and “post-liberal” (meaning a hybrid of contextual and international dynamics, institutions, norms, law, and actors). There have been often surprising hints of this evolution in various phases of the peace processes in Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Nepal, and Northern Ireland, offering possibilities for a hybrid form of peace. However such an evolution has rarely been sustained. Instead the interaction of liberal peacebuilding and orthodox terrorism approaches has tended to reinforce securitised states, or virtually liberal and thinly cosmopolitan states, which themselves replicate the conditions of conflict.

Liberal peacebuilding approaches that are (more often than not) designed and executed as top-down policies, in tandem with the controversies generated by dominant approaches to terrorism, often confound efforts that seek to produce a durable and sustainable peace. They rest on exclusive normative systems and exacerbate the motives that terrorism and extremism often draw on, or enable a pool of supporters motivated by the cultural, identity, or welfare exclusions the liberal peace allows. Furthermore they also reinforce the very state institutions that often produce such exclusions. They reflect a liberal project, wherein local interests are insufficiently represented (even marginalised in cases). This has led scholars to question the effectiveness, the appropriateness, and the legitimacy of liberal peacebuilding.<sup>2</sup> This is particularly problematic where “terrorism” has been used as a strategy to overturn an old order, or to attack the establishment of a new one through a peace process.<sup>3</sup> The intention to reconstruct stability as framed by the liberal peace and influenced by so-called orthodox understandings of terrorism and their security implications, and the concurrent neglect of the underlying sources of conflict, suggest that the nature of the “peace” that is being built is not entirely inclusive or context sensitive.<sup>4</sup> It normally rests on the exclusion of terrorist actors as well as perceived “non-liberal” actors, at least until they renounce the use of violence, producing a “catch 22” situation where they must give up their leverage before arriving at the negotiating table, the outcome of which is predetermined by the liberal peace’s conditionalities. These include democratic majorities, political and business elites, pluralist states, a rule of law and state controlled security, neoliberal development and a civil society where individualism fragments the capacity for social control, either by states or by revolutionary or terrorist organisations. Furthermore the peace that is being built is influenced by an externalised political, economic, and cultural geography which needs to be protected from radical difference, from non-state self-determination, and from alternative claims to legitimacy. To put it in different terms, the aforementioned are more akin to “statebuilding” rather than “peacebuilding.”<sup>5</sup>

This article assesses whether the emergence of hybrid peace processes in which critical positions engage with agendas beyond liberal, orthodox, or critical frameworks may counter these dynamics in practice. It examines the impact of peace processes and the development of institutions that bridge local and international differences, thus producing a hybrid model of “local-liberal” peace, which may be more inclusive and may also gain traction and legitimacy even with the most “incorrigible” of spoilers.<sup>6</sup> It assesses whether this offers an opportunity to develop a post-liberal peace and a “post-terrorism” approach, which though strategically and normatively challenging, might engage more fully with root causes of violence and its prevention, with the normative aspirations of the liberal peace, and the troubling phenomena of terrorism committed in the name of peace (meaning national

aspirations or claims for power and representation) or against a peace process. The term “peace process” in our article denotes a process that aims at a negotiated settlement between the main parties to the conflict, including the government, the international community, the non- or sub-state actors that utilise violence against the government and other liberal forces (national and international), and of course the everyday society who is more often than not the main recipient of the violence and the suffering. It is a process that is sustained over a period of time (which differs from conflict to conflict, and from one region to another), and one which deals with the main constitutional, institutional, and normative issues in the conflict.

The next section outlines our theoretical framework. This is then juxtaposed with our case studies, which offer insights from conflicts where peacebuilding efforts have been more efficient, primarily because of their elasticity when it comes to the inclusion of actors and potential hybridity. These are compared with situations where such elasticity has not been present. In Northern Ireland and Nepal, for instance, terrorists have become accepted politicians, which in turn led to a significant recession of violence and to more meaningful and focused attempts to build peace. It is for this reason that our use of the term “terrorism” goes beyond the semantics accorded to it by orthodox terrorism theories and their use by states, and indeed by all our case studies. Taking into consideration the endless debates on the definition of the phenomenon, we define “terrorism” as the incitement of, or threat to incite, terror in an attempt to maximise gains in a conflicting political relationship. Moreover, and in line with the inclusionary character of a post-liberal peacebuilding framework, our discussion of “terrorism” incorporates not only the most hard-line of actors that are ideologically opposed to liberal peace (within a terrorist organisation or perhaps as “incomprehensible” as Aum Shinrikyo) but also those actors who use political violence in order to expose and rectify actual grievances concerning representation, subsistence, and identity. This is not to justify any use of violence, but to paraphrase Clausewitz, terrorism is politics by other means.<sup>7</sup> Peacebuilding seeks to provide politics with a non-violent normative, institutional, legal, and financial framework. Clearly one of the lessons of the last twenty years, from Cambodia to Afghanistan, is that peace processes need to be as inclusive as possible if they are to retain legitimacy and forward momentum.

### **Towards Post-Liberal Peacebuilding and a Post-Terrorism Framework**

It has been established that orthodox and even critical approaches that respond to terrorism may reproduce mutual resistance, which is reflected in liberal institutions, even if they aspire to a critical role of emancipation.<sup>8</sup> It is also well known that there are channels of communication that transgress legality and formality even where terrorism is concerned in an effort to establish an often liberally oriented peace process. This hints at political and indeed cultural openness even in the midst of the most extreme violence. Yet, at the same time it is also clear that these dynamics often juxtapose liberal and non-liberal value systems. These tensions can be harnessed not to produce the now typical deadlock over security, sovereignty, institutions, rights, or needs provision, but to produce forms of hybrid peace. This requires a hybrid peace process to bridge the polarities of mutual resistance between states, combatants, and terrorist actors, to internalise the norms of peace over violence, and to lead to a compromise which preserves everyday integrity especially relating to rights and needs.<sup>9</sup> This also raises the question of how to negotiate a new hybrid peace between

terrorists, militants, and other actors who use violence for political reasons and liberal states to produce a hybrid, post-liberal form of peace. This would interrogate the claims made by those using political violence as well as the liberal peace in the areas of rights, needs, governance, and security. It also raises the issue of whether a hybrid peace will mainly represent the state, liberal actors, those who control the means of violence (i.e., it mainly represents power), or whether it will resolve the structural conditions of conflict (i.e., it represents everyday forms of peace)?<sup>10</sup>

Contemporary approaches to liberal peacebuilding aim to produce states which have significant institutions, control of security and territory, but intervene little in local or global markets and provide only limited safety nets or public services. Thus, it fails to benefit those who most need a sustainable and durable peace. It may exacerbate the types of polarisation that occur that feed terrorism in society. This might be because of a range of exclusions and proscriptions decided either internally or externally, or because it fails to focus on resolving root causes (especially relating to material and structural matters),<sup>11</sup> or because the social, economic, and political inappropriateness of the project exacerbates and reproduces frictions and conflicts rather than eliminating them. Moderate and inclusive grassroots actors that are far more reliable and trustworthy, or have a localised perspective on where causal factors emanate from and which actors are involved, and also may have access to localised strategies to disempower those who want to use violence, are repeatedly overlooked by the international community. Instead, the latter seems to favour negotiations with local power-brokers who are often exclusionary and extremist (perhaps covertly) from the perspective of many local commentators who are outside government, the state, or whose connections with international actors are minimal.

The nature of extremist and exclusionist local power-brokers holds the key to the manifestation of terrorism in conflicts where peacebuilding efforts are taking place. To exclude such actors because of their methods and because they may hold taboo positions or aspire to controversial ideologies and norms, denies the peace process access and the capacity to negotiate over these. The point of any such negotiation would be to minimise any demanded compromise on basic human rights and needs and to provide both to the general population as quickly as possible. Failure to do so may result in illiberal and negative forms of peace and the construction of a security state apparatus (as in Kashmir, the Middle East, or in Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Agreement), with its attendant long term failures to cement an inclusive peace. Or it produces a victor's peace, if elite or international actors have sufficient coercive capacity, based on terrorists' complete exclusion, as recently occurred in Sri Lanka. Both strategies are well known to be contradictory to a liberal peace, and its norms and rights. In many cases for long periods of time the internationals' mantra was not to negotiate with terrorists, thereby disabling significant local actors and aspects of a plausible peace process aimed at creating the liberal state. Moreover, the readiness with which both states and the internationals have equated entire communities with "terrorists" in certain cases, made the realisation of a liberal peace even more remote.<sup>12</sup> The outcome has been heavily militarised and illiberal states where poverty has dominated and been the marker, together with identity, of division.

This also connects with a key dynamic in the inter-relationship between orthodox terrorism and liberal peacebuilding approaches. Spoiling attacks on liberal peacebuilding tend to be taken as acts of insurgency or terrorism, and have as a result empowered a conservative rather than emancipatory version of the liberal

peace.<sup>13</sup> This conservative version rests on high levels of securitisation<sup>14</sup> and a focus on institutions over everyday life, which has an impact on budgets, policies, political and state objectives, and the amounts of resources individuals have access to in order to provide material substance to liberal rights, law, and potential. It is not emancipatory, so offers little hope of a self-sustaining peace: it cannot provide a social contract because it works by excluding segments of the population. In turn, as is evident in virtually all our case studies, this exclusion often leads to the empowerment of terrorist discourses. Thus root causes remain unaddressed, and securitisation of both state and its opposition intensifies, in a guerrilla war of attrition whose centralised power is ill suited to respond legitimately.

Critical approaches to understanding terrorism<sup>15</sup> appear to be more suited to liberal peacebuilding approaches, and offer more capacity for a peace at the everyday level, maintaining rights, law, and needs. However, though these are focused on cosmopolitan solutions to conflict, they also demand that potential interlocutors in any liberal peace process adopt the praxis of the liberal peace and liberal institutionalism (in other words, “become liberal”), without necessarily taking into consideration the potential inherent in grassroots and/or civil society movements.<sup>16</sup> This denies, to a lesser extent than more orthodox approaches, alterity and difference, which are also significant at the everyday level, the rejection of which may well be a causal factor of terrorist and political violence. In cases where all parties can be seen to be connected to, relate to, or are part of a liberal polity, progress in liberal peacebuilding can be very plausible. In cases where peace processes involve actors aspiring to different or multiple identities, liberal peacebuilding is relatively ineffective.

A post-terrorism/post-liberal hybrid peace process would capitalise on the dynamics of hybridity, both emerging and needed. It would require more open forms of negotiation, more engagement with all actors who have a stake in local, state, and regional politics, an engagement with “local-local” dynamics, needs as well as rights. This represents a struggle for legitimacy in an international and regional terrain, a state terrain, and a local terrain. At the international level, the orthodox terrorism and liberal peacebuilding approach are in tension over international legitimacy: this represents security versus peace, or the realist architecture of the securitised state versus the liberal architecture of the institutionalised, law-governed, civil society and market oriented state. At the local level, especially beneath civil society (at the local-local level where alterity is present)<sup>17</sup> there is a mixture of marginal legitimacy for terrorism aims (though not necessarily their tactics), support for a liberal state, and strong legitimacy for hybridity resulting from local agency and identity.

This represents a possibility for a local-liberal hybrid form of peace,<sup>18</sup> and offers some opportunities, if recognised for a negotiation of the frameworks of peace, the negation of terrorist violence, the acceptance of difference, and to some degree the maintenance of liberal and cosmopolitan norms. It rests on hybrid forms of politics, rescues peace processes from terrorism, the liberal peace from a lack of local consent, and develops local-liberal hybridity which offers the chance of a more sophisticated peace than that which has emerged in orthodox environments, such as in Kashmir or Sri Lanka. Contrary to realist and orthodox frameworks that seek to guarantee the actors’ security before any peace is established, post-terrorism seeks to incorporate and reconcile even those actors whose agenda is opposed to liberal institutionalist approaches as the peace itself is negotiated and formed. To some degree there may be glimmers of this post-terrorism approach in Nepal and in Northern Ireland.

Making clear that this is a post-liberal peace process would offer “incorrigible” actors the incentive of constructing a hybrid order drawing on their own identities, customs, and interests, as well as those of the liberal peace and its benefits. It gives all a stake in the outcome of a peace process which probably surpasses their stake in an outcome configured by relations of power, victory, or defeat.

Of course, this does not mean the acceptance of violence—far from it—but it does mean that more nuanced and localised understandings of legitimacy at the local level need to be seen as complementary to international and state legitimacy, and indeed constitutive of a broader legitimacy for approaches to terrorism and peacebuilding where they interact. It would be far more commensurate with security, democracy, law, and rights embodied in stable institutions, as well as representative of contextual alterity which might modify them.

This analysis gives rise to a number of categories, as indicated by our case studies, with a range of implications, relating to the interplay of terrorism approaches and peacebuilding.

1. The first category indicates that orthodox terrorism approaches justify a conservative liberal peace and is used to prevent the latter progressing towards a more stable version, resting on nationalism. Key actors are excluded and hybridity is denied by all sides in the dispute, often through force.
2. The second indicates that an orthodox terrorism approach might lead to an orthodox form of liberal peace but this depends on the conflict actors forming their own state, resting on ethnonationalist understandings of legitimacy. Hybridity is blocked or managed by separation but contacts between disputants may be more flexible.
3. The third indicates that critical terrorism approaches can support liberal peacebuilding, but may block a move to a more contextual form of peacebuilding in a context where liberal values are not widely held, and especially where secessionism is feared. All actors are included in the peace process, but hybridity favours the state and formal actors.
4. The final category indicates how post-terrorism approaches might support an inclusive and hybrid form of post-liberal peace that has international and local legitimacy and promotes a wider reconciliation.

In the next section we turn to illustrations from our case studies which illustrate these dynamics.

### **Orthodox Categories of Terrorism and Liberal Peacebuilding**

#### ***Sri Lanka: Orthodox Terrorism With Elements of a Conservative Liberal Peace Approach***

The change of government and western attitudes towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka is indicative of the effect of 9/11 on anti-terrorist and/or statebuilding discourses. The initial priority of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's government during 2001-2002, with international donor assistance, was the development of the Tamil region and a concurrent peace process, quietly facilitated by Norwegian diplomats, assuming that this would be enough to turn a substantial number of LTTE supporters against the use of political violence and for the peace process. Yet, neither state nor non-state terrorism subsided

completely because the political solutions brought forward did not address the root issue of autonomy and independence. At the start of the peace process, the government referred to the extremists as the LTTE, recognising them as a political entity, opponents and/or group with a specific and particular socio-political agenda. After 9/11 the term used to describe LTTE by governmental forces and agencies was simply “terrorists.” The same change in attitude became evident in the general population who, after 2005, referred to LTTE as “terrorists” as the full force of the state was turned against them.<sup>19</sup> This had a commensurate effect on the peace process which rapidly came to be seen as implausible.

The collapse of the peace process cannot be solely attributed to the incongruence and discord between the two main actors. Nor can it be blamed on the intermediaries, or the lack of a peace dividend for the state and its citizens. The liberal expectations and agendas of the international community, seeking an immediate improvement on democracy and human rights, did not reflect the preparedness of either the government or the LTTE, nor was their much local or international sincerity in their application. The hurried international attempts after 2002 to bring about a successful completion of the peace process, without the necessary understanding by the local actors of the need to incorporate and implement democratic and human rights reforms, are equally to blame, in the absence of a significant capacity to redistribute a material peace dividend, though development was certainly experienced in parts of the LTTE controlled areas.

For, while the Sri Lankan government accepted that the LTTE would need time to accept such proposals, the international community continued to put pressure on the government despite the fact that there were no international actors that could exert leverage over LTTE. Instead of incremental measures, negotiations, and compromises, the international community in essence adopted the same stance as Prabakharan’s<sup>20</sup> personal agenda: no compromise.<sup>21</sup> Initially, while the peace process was still owned by local actors, it looked promising. As soon as they could, the international community stepped in and not only took over as the primary promoter of peace, but sidelined the local actors and even undermined the Norwegian efforts that until then had brought the possibility of a sustainable peace closer than ever before.<sup>22</sup>

As the process began to collapse, perhaps more importantly as well as cynically, branding the LTTE as a terrorist organisation excluded them from a series of rounds of negotiations that took place in Western capitals,<sup>23</sup> thus hindering from within all efforts to promote and establish a durable and sustainable peace. The LTTE should not be absolved from the crimes and abuses of human rights it committed, but this also does not justify Prabakharan’s personal strategy.<sup>24</sup> His politics alienated a substantial part of the Tamil population but, more significantly, they allowed the government to justify its human rights abuses in the name of national security—as the recent UN Human Rights Report attests.<sup>25</sup> A better understanding of the context is necessary in both cases because rather than merely resting on identifying terrorist actors and agendas or maintaining a liberal peace agenda, it can provide the international community with an understanding of those actors capable and willing to participate in the production of a hybrid peace: one that may incorporate liberal institutional norms tailored to and fomented by local particularities, but not securitised either by terrorism or orthodox terrorism praxis. Unfortunately, Prabakharan’s agenda was to produce an exclusive form of peace which continues to favour the Sinhala majority.

Yet the main lesson to be learned from more recent events in Sri Lanka is that the international community's and state actors' discourse of liberal peace is more often than not camouflaged as a pure counter-terrorist strategy, with little concern for the liberal norm of human rights protection and democratic rule.<sup>26</sup> Thus liberal peacebuilding parallels orthodox terrorism and the securitisation of the state. It favours a state with a firm grip on security and a rule of law over human rights and welfare. Yet at the same time liberal peacebuilding is clearly blocked by orthodox terrorism approaches applied by the state and international community. The Norwegian mediation efforts that came closer than ever to a compromise that would have seen a share in power, some degree of self-rule, and the elimination of violence, were spoiled by the Sinhalese government because they were deemed to be working in favour of Tamil rights and independence, even if they seemed to offer a critical bridge between ending terrorism and making peace.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, with local NGOs that attempted to foment some kind of peace: for the government, any such non-governmental actor has been equated with the LTTE, and under counter-terrorist laws all NGOs had to inform local police stations before they engaged in any initiative.<sup>28</sup> A combination of international complicity,<sup>29</sup> Chinese strategic support, the legitimacy of a counter-terrorism strategy, and the success of the Rajapaksa government made this confluence seem plausible. Orthodox terrorism approaches undermined liberal peacebuilding and evacuated local alterity in conformity with the nationalist Sinhala strategy of the post-independence era.

In May 2009 governmental forces defeated the LTTE and put an end to 25 years of violence. This article does not wish to engage in an evaluation of military anti- or counter-terrorist strategies. Instead, we wish to highlight the alternative routes that could have been possible and perhaps more effective (as will be shown in the following sections) had the international community upheld its very own norms of the protection of human rights and the promotion of democratic administration, while also accommodating local contextuality (often termed "local ownership" and participation). In the case of Sri Lanka, the importance of state security was superior to the guarantee of human rights,<sup>30</sup> both towards the end of the conflict where civilians were intentionally targeted,<sup>31</sup> as well as after the LTTE had been defeated: the detention of 14,000 suspects, a further 130,000 refugees placed in camps, and videos of extra-judicial killings bear testament to this.<sup>32</sup> It raises a further question of whether there are steps that might now be taken to prevent a reversion to violence despite the fact that the LTTE agenda remains extant, that a nationalist Sinhala government has a firm grip on power, strong international support as well as condemnation exists, and there is a government-held aversion to third party assistance or accountability?

In this case dynamics of hybridity have long been in existence at the social level, but these have been less visible from the state and international perspective than the institutional and counter-terrorist discourses. The latter have controlled formal modes of legitimacy, and local actors have generally fallen into line with ethnonationalist discourses, apart from a few key NGOs. Thus, the orthodox terrorism and liberal peacebuilding approach support the notion of a state but contradict each other over the issue of a nationalist or pluralist form of state. The dominant Sinhala majority have embraced the liberal architecture of the institutionalised, law-governed, civil society and market oriented state. At the local level, the local-liberal hybrid is more apparent, and was so particularly during the Norwegian backed peace process, where there were opportunities for a negotiation of the frameworks of peace, the negation of terrorist violence, the acceptance of difference, and to some

degree the maintenance of liberal and cosmopolitan norms. This emergence of a post-terrorism and post-liberal approach, however, was blocked by the return to a more nationalist and orthodox terrorism approach under President Rajapaksa which has ironically undermined the liberal state, though it also blocked the possible negotiated secession of the LTTE.

### ***Kashmir: Balancing Orthodox Terrorism and Conservative Liberal Peace***

In Kashmir, unlike in Sri Lanka, an orthodox approach to terrorism has blocked peacemaking since the start of the conflict, due to the fact that it constitutes an issue of discord between two nuclear superpowers with aspirations to maintain nationhood status and territorial control, and that are against secessionism or self-determination. Since 2004 the two sides have taken incremental rapprochement steps with the aim of reducing tensions, violence, and fatalities. These have included the opening of back-channel/track II diplomatic contacts, the reopening of a trade route that had been shut for over 60 years, and the formation by the Indian PM of advisory groups whose aim is the negotiation and improvement of issues of everyday life, independence/self-determination, violence, and reduction of army presence. The Indian redeployment of 5000 of its troops from Jammu and Kashmir is indicative of that effort and the overall discourse of peace that could be seen to be emerging, though of course this was mainly subservient to national rather than everyday interests, and such developments have more recently been halted.

Nevertheless, the peace process has always been too weak, top down, and elitist, focused on sovereignty, national prestige, territory and borders, to be seriously effective—let alone sustained and self-sustainable. It is a peace process in which the subjects are the states of Pakistan and India, rather than the people who live in the region. Political, military, social, and economic elites at either side of the border have a vested interest in the continuation of the conflict.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the armies of both countries impose their own will and understanding on the situation: Pakistan's military has fuelled violence by aiding extremist groups and by fomenting radicalisation among the population, even as recently as January 2010;<sup>34</sup> while the Indian military has a very strong presence in the area (800,000 troops) and even when announcements of troops withdrawal are made, these retired officers are then turned into paramilitaries in order to fight insurgents and extremist groups.<sup>35</sup> Thus, India seems to succumb to international pressures to de-escalate the crisis, without necessarily loosening its tight grip. This means that an orthodox approach to terrorism makes more sense to either side than a liberal peacebuilding approach does, because it would aid irredentist or secessionist impulses through the move towards rights and majoritarian notions of democracy.<sup>36</sup> The problem with this is that it reifies the territorial, sovereign, and nationalist side of the conflict, places its resolution in the hands of the elites invested in these dynamics, and disempowers local populations. This opens the way for some to exploit the situation through violence, the marginalisation of civil society, and the loss of a social contract. Those who refrain from violence risk becoming both the victims of terrorism and of nationalism just as those who do not refrain. This means there needs to be an approach which rewards democratic politics over violence and nationalism.

However, the general view in national capitals on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) is “why talk to local Kashmiri politicians if we are already engaged in talks with Pakistan[or India]?”<sup>37</sup> This is exacerbated by the fact that there are few

political interlocutors in Kashmir that could be considered credible by Delhi politicians—and vice versa.<sup>38</sup> They are regarded as a front for terrorism or secessionism, or oppression. These perceptions revolve around a toxic mix of state sovereignty and identity where inflexible versions of both deny both. Orthodox terrorism perspectives enable this dead end, and liberal peace exacerbates competing demands for statehood because it is interpreted in a conservative manner—as statebuilding. The relatively recent and brief turn to politics and abandonment of violence by local representatives did not carry enough weight to convince the central authorities to seek serious dialogue with the region's politicians, in parallel with the peace talks and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that took place between India and Pakistan. It was argued that India is very good at negotiating with militants, but not really adept at running multi-track peace processes.<sup>39</sup> Its viewpoint is ingrained with the assumptions of orthodox terrorism and it is resistant to the liberal peace for Kashmir, because of its broader implications for its relations with Pakistan, and implicitly the state itself.

This implies that Kashmir has been left purposefully undeveloped and under the constant watch of the Indian army. In terms of employment as a way of ameliorating aspects of everyday life and providing some sense of security and stability to the local population, violence has made it impossible to generate private investment given state investment is limited by its high security bill for the region. Yet most facilities in Kashmir are state-owned and state-regulated, which makes for few opportunities and very little infrastructure.<sup>40</sup> Even though international development organisations (the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme) suggested that the valley should be declared a free economic zone that enables trade across the LoC, both the Indian and Pakistani governments are very reluctant to support Kashmiri development, despite its potential.<sup>41</sup> As such, even the much-celebrated opening of the road to Muzaffarabad (capital of Pakistani Kashmir) did not yield much because clearance across the LoC is too cumbersome.

Any territorial and constitutional change in Kashmir generates fears in Delhi of a snowball effect that will make other Indian states seek independence.<sup>42</sup> The Indian government is also weary of benevolent outside help in terms of peacebuilding. Responding to an offer of assistance made by the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi in 2009, the Indian government highlighted the significance of it being seen to engage wilfully and unaided in the amelioration of the situation. For that purpose it pointed to a series of CBMs that are currently in place, and others that are pending implementation. These included the release of prisoners who have been incarcerated longer than their court sentence; the release of prisoners who are not hard core militants and do not pose any threat; the transparent and public prosecution of force personnel involved in human rights violations; and generous development spending.<sup>43</sup> These measures, among others, are the ones that confirm the orthodox character of the state counter-terrorist discourse and its complicity in reinforcing the power relationship at the expense of a more sophisticated peace: why are non-threatening individuals held? Why have individuals been kept longer than their sentences dictated? Why have force personnel involved in human rights violations not been publicly prosecuted until now? Despite the CBMs, however, and with the exception of the city of Jammu (explained partly by higher levels of development compared to other areas in Kashmir), resentment for the Indian government remains widespread and deeply rooted. The division between autonomists and separatists in the ranks of

local Kashmiri politicians mirrors the overall population's will. In a survey conducted in August 2007,<sup>44</sup> 87% of those asked in Srinagar favoured an independent Kashmir, as they could not identify with either Pakistan or India. 95%, however, of those asked in Jammu stated that Kashmir should not secede from India.

Orthodox notions of territoriality have been reproduced at the expense of rights, needs, and ambitions, even when they are expressed in non- or anti-violent terms. 80,000 deaths in the region have made the vast majority of the population reluctant to support any type of militants. Yet the orthodox policies and attitudes of both governments also alienate the citizenry.<sup>45</sup> As is typical with the liberal frameworks of peacebuilding, the individual and communal perceptions of peace are excluded, sidelined, and overlooked when compared to those of officialdom and elites.<sup>46</sup> It reflects a disciplinary framework that rests on coercion, a lack of consent, conditionality, and the prioritisation of elite interests.<sup>47</sup>

These latter consequently connect to orthodox terrorism approaches which cement the dynamics the conflict feeds on by militarising the territory and confirming both ethnic and state nationalism. Security and multiple forms of identity coexist in permanent tension with secession confirming the ontology of orthodox terrorism which drives a conservative version of liberal peacebuilding as relying on state security first, along with institutions, the rule of law, human rights, and civil society. Unanswered questions over which state, what type of state, and whose security is at stake means the liberal agenda is never achieved. Yet its focus on the state and institutions seems to confirm the orthodox agenda, meaning a no-war, no-peace situation<sup>48</sup> has become the status-quo. This highlights both the internal contradictions of liberal peace and terrorism approaches, as well as their mutual complementarity—albeit with its unintended consequences of reinforcing conflict and debilitating peace.

In this case a pluralist set of political institutions are clearly required to organise politics at the local level to reflect the very obvious need to include a broader range of actors in the peace process and to produce hybrid institutions and territorial arrangements. Liberal peacebuilding might offer these but for the determination of both states to maintain power. Orthodox terrorism theory supports these antagonistic positions. More critical and emancipatory versions of both might help unravel these positions, and would imply post-liberal and post-terrorist understandings of the conflict. The question of legitimacy is multifaceted in Kashmir, but clearly both states and both civil societies have differing opinions, and never have been able to impose themselves full on the other. A focus on local-local notions of legitimacy, and their relationships with both states might transcend arteriosclerotic positions such as the aforementioned. This would again represent a local-liberal hybrid.

### ***Israel/Palestine: A Hybrid State, But Neither Post-Terrorism nor Post-Liberal***

The aforementioned approach of exploiting peace processes in order to preserve territorial integrity and advance state-security, so hardening the liberal peace into a conservative, securitisation, and institutional model is also evident in the Middle East, where military and political elites are very sceptical when it comes to accepting—let alone promoting—an emancipatory peace that is established through liberal governance and its institutions. Unlike other conflicts, where the implementation of liberal conditionalities imposed by the international community is more visible,<sup>49</sup> the

international organisations that have intervened in the Middle East have often been sidelined and/or ignored. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the initiatives of such institutions are either not trusted by local elites because they are not sufficiently invested in their identities, or they are seen as representative of a set of conditions that seek to undermine the political and cultural gains of one group over the other.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, Israel has always been perceived of by liberal elites as part of the society of liberal states. Thus, international strategy has been mainly that pressure should be placed upon the Palestinians to develop the liberal reflexes that will allow them to build and develop those institutions necessary for the establishment and promotion of a liberal state.

It is this framework that led to the proposition of a two-state solution in the region, first expressed in the 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181.<sup>51</sup> Ever since then, and particularly after the end of the Cold War, when the liberal peace was promoted as the most viable solution for inter- and intra-state conflicts, every attempt to reach a compromise in the region was centred on the creation of a Palestinian state. Nevertheless, failure to do so cannot solely be attributed to the lack of will of the conflicting parties—for instance terror attacks and targeted killings that continued on both sides, the issue of settlements that to this day threaten the derailment of the most recent round of negotiations,<sup>52</sup> and the eruption of the second intifada. The Oslo Peace Accords, or Declaration of Principles (DoP) were undoubtedly derailed and condemned to failure because of the parties' lack of will to reach peace in partnership, partly because of very orthodox understandings of terrorism and the inflexibility of a conservative understanding of the liberal peace. The DoP failed to bear fruit because it ignored what had by then become the core root of the conflict: the socio-economic conditions that affected most Palestinians—implying a broader inequality in material and identity terms—and which were brought to the fore with the first Intifada. While the DoP for the first time ever accorded an equal status to Palestinians and Israelis, it too fell victim to the traps of statebuilding camouflaged as peacebuilding. First, the symmetry it accorded to the actors was virtual for it was an agreement between an “occupying power and an occupying people.”<sup>53</sup> Second, the DoP favoured the creation of a Palestinian state without taking into consideration internal political divisions and factions vying for power. Nor did it comprehend the difficulty of the day-to-day operation of a Palestinian state without the constant involvement of Israel.

In that sense, therefore, the DoP (along with most other peace efforts in the region) did not attempt to address the needs of the grassroots actors for whom it was supposedly promoting a liberal state. In fact, as it was argued by independent peacebuilding NGOs, not only has the grassroots level not been addressed but it has even been undermined by Track I approaches.<sup>54</sup> Peace efforts have adopted an overtly political top-down approach, thus regurgitating and recycling state-centric notions of peace and security.<sup>55</sup> This places power in the hands of elites who focus on nationalist goals, on related identity matters, and then construct a security narrative on that basis. In this sense liberal statebuilding has developed in an intimate relationship with orthodox understandings of terrorism as a security threat which requires a liberal state (strong for Israel and weak for Palestinians) which guarantees security. But the state is internationally and locally contested, and its legitimacy is in doubt.

The credibility of the liberal peace framework in the region has continued to be undermined even after the failure of the Oslo Accords. From the international point

of view, the most poignant example is the international community's refusal to accept the electoral result that saw Hamas winning seventy-six of the 132 parliamentary seats in January 2006. This reaction is indicative of the liberal peace model's inability—even in critical or cosmopolitan form—to engage in dialogue with actors who are seen as “unacceptable”—even though they were politically empowered, legitimated, and electorally mandated by the very people the liberal model claims to want to serve. What makes this attitude even more significant is the inability of the internationals to recognise the reasons behind Hamas' electoral results: namely, the weariness of Palestinians with the corrupt, ineffective, and in cases indifferent regime of Fatah (as well as strategic regional support).<sup>56</sup> Progress even towards a liberal peace is blocked by the heavily securitised discourse associated with orthodox terrorism. Israel's assassination and arrest of so many elected Hamas officials, for instance, undermines the Palestinians' faith in electoral mechanisms, thus undercutting the liberal end of hybridity.<sup>57</sup> Instead, the focus is on state security and liberal institutions over human needs associated with liberal peace theory. Thus local legitimacy has been lost because territory, sovereignty, rights, and justice have been compromised by both Israel and external actors. Neoliberal economic strategies have been applied to deal with poverty and its causal dynamics.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the peace and state that has emerged since the early 1990s is one where its territory and security is controlled by Israel, its economy is also to be integrated into the global economy often via Israel, its budget is supported by external donors (mainly the EU), and its institutions are based on those of liberal democracy, modified informally by local networks of patronage. It is a neoliberal and hybrid state without sovereignty, and without the capacity to sustain itself or to meet basic liberal norms of human rights applied equally to all citizens and communities in the region.

This highlights the inconsistency between the theory and the practice of liberal peace frameworks, as well as the commitment of Western states to human rights, something that has even been criticised by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories.<sup>59</sup> In other words, employing orthodox terrorism discourses in order to debilitate a violent group might in fact reinvigorate its social and political acceptance by those segments of the population which the peacebuilders attempt to incorporate into the peace efforts. Furthermore it may lead to a type of state that has little chance of viability, and be almost completely dependent on external support. This discourse denies alterity, even where it is deeply ingrained in culture, identity, religion, and political processes, and reifies a form of sovereignty which is instrumental in blocking meaningful negotiations or engagements with everyday life.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the liberal peace model is connected to an orthodox state discourse that promotes exclusionary notions of security even where territorial pluralism has marked recent history, and recognises, negotiates with, and politically enriches already and/or traditionally established elites. For these elites, a difficult path between aiming at maintaining international credibility by accepting the liberal peace framework as well as the orthodox terrorism framework must be charted. In addition localised constituencies must be maintained. These elaborate constraints produce a range of responses which contradict in public and private transcripts, sometimes separately, at local, state (embryonic or recognised), and international levels. It is a hybrid, agonistic, and post-liberal process, in which compromises and concessions appear to be driven by contradictory norms of peace, rather than the more liberal and orthodox forms of strategic and securitised

interests, borders, and territory. The peace process has fluctuated between being inclusive and exclusive and the much needed hybridity that has emerged represents power rather than the diversity of an everyday peace as a consequence.

Rather than offering a basis for emancipation, the Middle East remains trapped in a sovereign discourse about security, and the neat but impractical connection of national identity with territorial claims, as opposed to pragmatic everyday requirements for peace. What is necessary is an attitude and a framework that promotes human security in more inclusive terms, transcends the political use of terrorism as a practice of violence and a discourse of exclusion, and the use of the liberal peace as an alien set of institutions and normative standards where they are not consented to in situ. Post-terrorist, post-sovereign, post-colonial, and post-liberal sensibilities are required by local, state, and international actors to transcend such blockages and to reconstruct local, regional, and international legitimacy for the Middle East which reflects the consent of each constituency. In other words, then, what is needed is a post-liberal introspection of the liberal peace frameworks that may well lead to a new era of post-terrorist politics. This recognition and mutual renegotiation of legitimacy would represent the local-liberal hybrid, rescuing the peace processes from terrorism and the liberal peace and its state model from a lack of local consent. This would be again far more commensurate with democracy and rights embodied in stable institutions, as well as representative of contextual alterity which might modify them.

## **Towards a Post-Terrorism, Post-Liberal Peace Category**

### ***Nepal: Post-Terrorism But Not Post-Liberal***

Following the events of 9/11, Maoist extremists decided to switch their strategy and, in exchange for political recognition and participation in the government, they declared that they would renounce their violent tactics.<sup>60</sup> Both sides agreed to this, transcending the exclusive claims of legitimacy and sovereignty of one side, and the argument for representation and the use of violence on the other. This change coincided with the severe counter-terrorist measures of the government that led to both the abuse of human rights and the weakening of the Maoists. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Nepalese government and the (Maoist) Unified Communist Party of Nepal in November 2006 has produced a peace of sorts between the two groups, with the help of the UN, which has maintained the process of liberal statebuilding and the maintenance of sovereignty. Terrorism has ended though acute political tensions remain over power-sharing, security, and the reconfiguration of power. Nevertheless, the conflict is now adopting a more ethnic dimension, with groups in the South like the Terai people (who claim to constitute 40% of Nepal's population) making their own claims for autonomy and representation. Furthermore, UN's mandate<sup>61</sup> is significantly limited to facilitating processes between a bipolar nexus (government and Maoists), without substantial involvement at the grassroots level.

Under the CPA, the government forces are limited inside their barracks whereas the Maoist combatants are confined inside cantonments monitored by the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). As a result, state security is undermined and armed groups in the South operate relatively freely. The majority of these groups were allied to the Maoists before the peace process began. However, support for the Maoists has

dwindled when they failed to meet promises of ethnic proportional representation and local empowerment. Lacking the organisation of the Maoists, these groups are now more a conglomeration of warlords than a political threat to the government—although the security of the state is actively undermined because, unlike the Maoists, these groups increasingly target civilians. The violence exhibited by these groups represents a continuation of the Maoist tactics, not because they will generate direct results but because they are noticed by the government and by internationals.<sup>62</sup> Preoccupied exclusively with the Maoists at the political level, the government does not seem to want to engage with any of the southern groups calling for federation and/or autonomy, thus marginalising all other moderate, non-violent voices that raise the same issue(s).

While even senior figures in Kathmandu admit that lack of development is a serious issue that exacerbates violence in the southern regions,<sup>63</sup> government and Maoists suppress grassroots attempts to establish a peace that provides for human security. The lack of an institutional framework that secures the work of human rights activists means that NGOs are very limited in their interactions with grassroots movements in the affected regions. The peace process is an “empty process”<sup>64</sup> because the Maoists and the government have marginalised the human rights and civil society networks that sparked the 1996 peace movement.<sup>65</sup> Even where local NGOs are active, widespread corruption means that they are probably a front for political involvement rather than addressing everyday grassroots issues. The result is that those who manage the liberal peace also manage political constituencies and the flow of aid/development capital.<sup>66</sup> International NGOs, on the other hand, have come under attack because, instead of reflecting their very own messages of social inclusion and participation/representation, they in fact reproduce and reinforce class and caste divisions.<sup>67</sup>

The attitude of the international community towards the Nepalese grassroots is highly ambivalent. Most international actors seemed to be more concerned with the international attributes of the liberal peace (elections, institutions-building, etc.) than with the everyday, local characteristics and needs as they emerge after a significant cessation of violence. These are seen from the government and international level to be retrogressive. More importantly, donors ignore the highly unequal socio-economic and socio-political foundations on which the old regime was resting, thus fomenting incentives for exiting the peace process for large sections of the population.<sup>68</sup> The UN's limited mandate means that Terai and Madhesi groups cannot enter talks with the government, unless the government accepts such calls for talks. The government does not wish to grant them any recognition. Both the government and the Maoists have co-opted the international community in order to continue their political game.

The peace that came forward with the CPA has never fully addressed the reasons why grassroots movements sided with the Maoist rhetoric. Nor did it address the means by which such support was received by the Maoist leadership. Consequently, this “bipolar” peace is one that fails to satisfy not only the need for human security brought forward by sectors of its population, but also the need for its own, national security. The “peace paradox” in Nepal is that, despite the lack of orthodox terrorism approaches, the liberal peace project has not flourished precisely because it was not allowed to be owned and developed at the everyday level—which would have generated a hybrid form—but instead has been influenced by an externalised set of standards and perspectives. It has been left with the same castes and elites to

administer and manage it according to their political interests. This has meant that the contextual dynamics of civil society peacebuilding have not been able to infuse the state or the elite level peace process sufficiently. As a result, the peace process has rested mainly on the elites' and international legitimacy level. While a post-terrorism approach allowed a negotiation process with the Maoists, the elitist and Eurocentric nature of the liberal peace's focus has meant much of the population remains excluded by its priorities.

As a first step away from an orthodox terrorism approach there are many lessons to be learned here. Unfortunately the focus on a fairly orthodox liberal peace approach has meant that the peace process has been elite focused, driven by external values and institutional frameworks, and has become trapped by the contradictory views of opposing groups rather than dealing with the everyday issues of the population. In this sense, a negotiation process has come into being, despite concerns about violence and its political intent, but the negotiations are limited by the contradictions inherent in classical concerns about sovereignty, boundaries, the control of power, as well as the locally depoliticising and decontextualised, external agendas promoting the liberal peace.

Clearly, in this case, to some degree the peace process coexists with violence but this is mitigated by the critical approach to terrorism and that the liberal peace process has adopted the praxis of the liberal peace. However, it has done less well in taking into consideration the potential inherent in grassroots and/or civil society movements, for which the Maoists and other groups have had to use strong arm tactics to gain traction. To some degree this has denied alterity and difference but some space has been left to begin the difficult process of embracing it. This may result in something more than a virtually liberal state, if the twin issues of securitisation and poverty can also be addressed. The emergence of localised hybridity would suggest that both needs and rights issues in their contextual settings would be focused on in order to develop a more embedded form of legitimacy. This would fulfil the potential for a hybrid and post-liberal peace which moves beyond the representation of power and into the everyday.

### ***Northern Ireland: Post Terrorism and Post-Liberal Peacebuilding?***

In Northern Ireland, a further step away from orthodox terrorism and orthodox liberal peace approaches was taken, with very significant results, but only after a long phase of more orthodox engagements was tried and had clearly failed to break the deadlock. The next step towards a post-liberal process was taken in the sense that the polity that was negotiated included both former combatants (using tactics associated with terrorism or state oppression) and a softening of some of the components of the liberal peace.<sup>69</sup> This included modifications to sovereignty, shared between local actors, the UK, and the Republic of Ireland (to limited degrees); power-sharing alterations to democracy; a move towards a notion of shared and porous sovereignty and borders where localised territorialisation remained in more limited form; massive state and EU investment to deal with poverty and inequality, including in civil society; deviations from the standard rule of law and human rights regimes; and the "europeanisation" of the peace process. This led to alternative and competing local forms of legitimacy which also connected to the liberal peace model, while offering some innovations. The shift from the formal liberal framework in Northern Ireland, however, is very limited because, broadly speaking, most parties have

accepted the liberal framework (especially its neoliberal variant), much as they may have been influenced in the past by religion, socialism, or other varied alternatives.

Northern Ireland is the only one of our cases that exhibits a more durable and sustainable peace, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the peace process began as diametrically opposed to orthodox understandings of counter-terrorism, and involved at the official level a struggle against various security services that had become embedded in these approaches. It was based on a process of communicational exchange that looked beyond the orthodox fears and securitised anxieties of the past. While back-channels were open and working since the 1970s,<sup>70</sup> it was not until the Labour government of Tony Blair that a more critical approach to Northern Irish terrorism began taking shape. Taking advantage of the back-channels that existed between them and the IRA, the British government (in close collaboration with the Irish government) reformulated its understandings of sovereignty and security in exchange for peace. It was also aided in this effort by the war-weariness of the local population and the anti-violence grassroots movements that began developing and that put pressure on the terrorist factions to find alternative ways to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, some of our sources have indicated that the only reason why peace emerged was because the British government did not want any more violence in mainland Britain, and particularly London.<sup>71</sup> Belfast, then, was subordinated to the interests of London.<sup>72</sup>

Secondly, the international community seemed as committed as the UK and Ireland in helping creating a space that would be conducive to peace. EU funding is still considered to be the most important contribution to the peace process. But more than that, the EU offered new understandings of regionalism, sovereignty, and co-existence that were welcomed at least by the state level actors. The supra-national character of the Union as well as its focus on its regions (rather than solely its member-states)<sup>73</sup> meant that decentralisation and devolution of power to regions from the state were not seen as succumbing to interests, or debilitating to central powers and authorities or their sovereignty.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore it enabled an introspective re-imagining and redefinition of the territorial identities espoused by the two communities.<sup>75</sup> Once this move had been made, the territorialised, securitised, orthodox approaches to terrorism and for peacebuilding appeared as problems rather than solutions. More than anything, the EU is the very reason why the British and Irish governments co-operated so closely.<sup>76</sup>

Of course, funding was equally crucial and unlike other conflicts examined in our article, the anti-violent and reconciliatory grassroots movements of Northern Ireland were significantly aided. Furthermore, it was appropriately used for redressing social, economic, and rights inequalities, and for developing an economy that was previously virtually inexistent because of the risks imposed by violence. Finally, the U.S. government had an equally important role to play, albeit during (rather than before or after) the peace process.<sup>77</sup>

What makes Northern Ireland's case poignant is the move away from orthodox frameworks of security, and towards an emancipatory dimension of the liberal peace that provides vital space for grassroots movements and the civil society to own and direct the peace process themselves, rather than having it imposed by (and tailored to) the interests of the state and/or the international society. Citizens were also given material capacity through a range of private investment, state, EU, and donor resources to enact their rights more equally. Many of the initiatives of external and local actors, from the EU, UK, to localised politics, enabled a move away from

orthodox terrorism approaches on all sides, as well as a decisive shift towards a liberal peace.<sup>78</sup> But on close examination, many of the tenets of the liberal peace, especially those related to a clear and Westphalian notion of sovereignty have been compromised on to provide ambiguous political institutions, territorial boundaries, powersharing, prosperity (from massive intergovernmental support), and an active role of civil society closely allied to sectarian identities as well as liberal norms. Here there is a clear hybridisation of the local with the liberal international. International assistance to peacebuilding should be precisely that—assistance. What differentiates the Northern Ireland case from the others already explored in this article is the engagement of policy makers, peacebuilders, NGOs, and donors with local civil society's potential to initiate and sustain a peaceful polity in a range of different but overlapping contextual frames. Civil society also found ways of expressing itself separately to institutions and formal channels, and much of this agency was facilitated by massive public investment in infrastructure, living conditions, for jobs, and opportunities. Everyday life in the end proved more important than sectarian pre-negotiation objectives, which have remained but as partially symbolic and historical aspirations associated with the historical process of changing identities.

The shift towards liberal peacebuilding in Northern Ireland indicated an engagement with root causes and a move away from orthodox terrorism approaches. This led from a situation where peace processes and violence coexisted to one where a peace process became the focus of political action and violence was marginalised. All the interlocutors adopted the praxis of the liberal peace and liberal institutionalism, and more importantly took into consideration the potential inherent in grassroots and/or civil society movements. All parties related to a liberal polity but even so this indicates perhaps the development of a post-terrorism/post-liberal hybrid process in that legitimacy began to be mutually constructed in line with international, regional, state, and local preferences. This rescued the peace process from terrorism, the liberal peace from a lack of local consent, and developed local-liberal hybridity to respond to the structural aspects of the conflict.

## **Conclusion**

Hybrid and more flexible peace processes are obviously required, but the four categories that emerge from the interaction of approaches to terrorism, as indicated by our case studies, have varying implications for the creations of an inclusive peace process and a hybrid form of peace (meaning post-terrorism and post-liberalism) (see Table 1). The first category of relationship between terrorism and peacebuilding tends to be self-defeating in terms of producing peace as can be seen in Kashmir and the Middle East, and may be the case in Sri Lanka, where hybrid peace processes and forms of peace have been blocked or used to maintain the power of the dominant state actor. The second category where an orthodox terrorism approach might lead to a liberal peace may arise in the Middle East and even Kashmir, depending on whether the conflict actors receive their own state and can express more localised, if ethnonationalist understandings of legitimacy. But even this seems tenuous in these cases as hybridity represents power and states are under pressure to separate (as in all the above cases to some degree). Again, a more flexible and open approach that can embrace hybrid identities, institutions, and sovereign arrangements is clearly required. The third category provides strong support, as in the case of Nepal, that critical terrorism approaches can support liberal peacebuilding, but again

**Table 1.** Interactions between terrorism and peacebuilding

|                       | Conservative liberal<br>peace                                                                                                                   | Orthodox liberal<br>peace                                                                                    | Post-liberal peace                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Orthodox<br>terrorism | Prevents a stable peace from forming; key actors are excluded; hybridity is denied                                                              | Rests on exclusive, often ethnonationalist legitimacy; depends on actors possessing their own Weberian state | Room for only partial hybridity (mimicry) because security, legitimacy, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state are paramount                                                                                                                   |
| Critical<br>terrorism | No room for Conservative Liberal Peace because a state's discriminatory policies have led to the manifestation of terrorism/excludes key actors | All actors are included in peace process, but state and formal/cosmopolitan actors are favoured              | Theoretically more possible, but critical terrorism focuses on the normative role of the state as opposed to the potential of the local/everyday                                                                                                           |
| Post-<br>terrorism    | Not applicable because key actors may not conform to liberal ideology                                                                           | Very limited applicability because non-liberal or hybrid actors will still be marginal                       | Leads to a more inclusive, post-liberal peace, with international, national and local legitimacy combined inclusively. Peace processes focus on inclusivity and pluralism, institutionalised in both international and everyday socio-historical contexts. |

though flexibility in the peace process over its inclusiveness has not translated into the hybridity of that process and its resultant institutions. Hybridity has again represented the state as a dominant actor. Indeed, it appears to have blocked a move to a more contextual form of peacebuilding even though liberal values in Nepal are not widely held, and remain contained within an elite strata of the political class and civil society. The final category, for which the sole exemplar is Northern Ireland, indicates how critical terrorism approaches enable a peace process to emerge, especially where significant material incentives exist for the populations. However, unlike Nepal, it is difficult to use this case to support a post-liberal form of peace because of the fact that liberal values are already widely held. However, in a perverse way—as all of

the other categories also suggest—there may be significant traction in hybridity being a legitimate goal in peacebuilding where diverse and pluralist ontologies exist.

Clearly, all of these cases hint at the need for a post-terrorist approach which enables at least the possibility of a hybrid and post-liberal peace, by allowing issues such as territory, sovereignty, rights, needs, and identity to become part of a negotiation process to shape the nature of state, institutions, norms, economy, and civil society. This post-terrorism, post-liberal approach would lead to an outcome commensurate with both local alterity and the ways in which they might be bridged with dominant conceptions of international norms and security. Strong hints of this approach are present in the cases of Nepal and Northern Ireland, which are the most successful of the cases examined. By comparison, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and the Middle East have at times also benefited from, or may in the future benefit from, such an approach.

A post-terrorism approach is integral to a post-liberal approach to peacebuilding in which a range of actors are brought into the processes for an end—state or form of peace—which is determined by that negotiation process, rather than by external interests, by orthodox assumptions of security for liberal states, and the latter's use as a blue print for conflict management around the world. It is precisely this consent and the engagement of peace process with the everyday life of the local populations that need to be engaged with to bring forward a hybrid model of peace: one that not only rests on (and foments) the liberal principles of a positive peace, but also one that incorporates local sensitivities, attitudes, and particularities. As our analysis of the Northern Ireland peace process has shown, it is easier for any peace process to be accorded legitimacy by grassroots movements when it takes into account the everyday needs of the local populations; when it does not marginalise grassroots in favour of elites; and when power-relations are not replicated at the expense of representation and legitimacy.

A post-liberal, post-terrorism agenda entails a praxis that would enable political, social, and economic organisations and institutions to represent and respect the communities they are effectively in a contractual relationship with. As a consequence, international forms of peacebuilding would be more likely to be participatory, empathetic, locally owned, and self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically, and environmentally speaking.<sup>79</sup> They provide a *via media* between different identities and interests, and they can guard against direct or structural violence, thus providing justice and equity.<sup>80</sup> What is more important, however, is that a post-liberal agenda also opens up the possibilities of post-terrorist frameworks and conducts of behaviour. The conflicts in Kashmir and Nepal highlight this possibility. In the first case, orthodox understandings of security, legitimacy, and representation (or lack thereof) have pushed the local populations towards the arms of “imported” terrorist groups, who rely on local feelings of oppression, opposition, and resentment towards the central authorities to implement and carry out their violent strategies. In the second case, more critical understandings on the part of internationals allowed for a more inclusive process—though with limitations. Since it is in the disputants' interest to maintain or foment conflict, the onus falls upon the international community to provide a *via media*, a dialogue between disputants and internationals of all levels that would make evident an ethical and acceptable discourse and praxis by which a post-liberal and post-terrorist peace might be achieved. In other words, the attitude and behaviour of the internationals is important when it comes to local populations rejecting or legitimising terrorist violence<sup>81</sup> and opening inclusive peace processes.

Reconciliation requires internationals not limiting their objectives to those contained solely within a liberal epistemology, especially where local actors are struggling to represent alterity rather than similarity. Post-terrorism and post-liberal approaches indicate the need for the rapid development of a broad and inclusive peace process that has the necessary material, cultural, ideational, and normative breadth to induce all actors away from supporting political or structural violence and negotiating a sustainable compromise.

## Notes

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2. First among these is John Paul Lederach’s *Building Peace* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997). For more recent analyses see among others Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics* (Manchester: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001); Ian Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order: Spoils of Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Roland Paris, *At War’s End* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007); Vivienne Jabri, *War and the Transformation of Global Politics* (London: Palgrave, 2007); Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner, *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding* (London: Palgrave, 2008); Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

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13. Newman and Richmond (see note 6 above). For the gradations of the liberal peace, see Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (see note 2 above), conclusion.

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